DEBATE
WORKPLACE FEDERALISM
In a decision from the last term, the Supreme Court held that a
state law prohibiting the use of state funds by employers for both antiand pro-union advocacy was preempted by federal law. Chamber of
Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008). The Brown decision sparks
this debate between Professors Paul M. Secunda, of Marquette University Law School, and Jeffrey M. Hirsch, of the University of Tennessee
College of Law, as to whether the federal government or the states are
best equipped to protect the rights of workers under the law.
Professor Secunda argues that federal regulation enacted to protect workers in the workplace has suffered from lack of enforcement
and political bias. Thus, because “the federal government . . . has
proven unwilling and unable to protect the basic rights of workers,”
he maintains that “state law should be permitted to play a complementary role in all of [the] areas of workplace regulation where federal law is silent or absent.” Individual states, then, could act as “laboratories”
that
could
“engage
in
thoughtful,
legislative
experimentation.” Finding the idea of an exclusive federal scheme
likely to result in “self-selection bias and inefficient prioritization of
agency resources,” he concludes that needed regulation may only be
available to the states.
Professor Hirsch counters that Professor Secunda’s proposal
would exacerbate the problems with the current underenforcement of
workers’ rights, which at least partly results from the complexity created by a regulatory framework made up of federal, state, and local
law. As a solution, Hirsch proposes that the federal government
should be given exclusive control of the workplace, under a single system of enforcement and regulation. His suggested changes include a
single workplace law statute, a single agency to administer that statute,
and a litigation-based enforcement approach that includes the creation of private-rights of action for violations and the creation of a specialized Article III labor and employment court. Thus, while conceding that “[t]he federal government’s regulation of the workplace has
been far from perfect,” he argues that “it is a far better choice than
fifty different state regimes.”
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OPENING STATEMENT
The Ironic Necessity for State Protection of Workers
†

Paul M. Secunda

I.
There is a palpable irony in turning to the states for assistance in
protecting workers in the workplace. Laws like the Railway Labor Act
of 1926, the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, and the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, were expressly enacted to take power
away from management-friendly state courts. Historically, these
courts, at a moment’s notice and often ex parte, intervened in labor
disputes and entered injunctions against unions and their allies based
on the whims of the judge. Proponents of the NLRA saw its enactment as a way to overcome these anti-union state influences and to
foster at the federal level the use of collective bargaining to promote
the workplace rights of employees.
Nevertheless, some seventy-five years later, it is the federal government that has proven unwilling and unable to protect the basic
rights of workers through exclusive federal regimes like the NLRA,
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), and the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). In such an environment, it
is time to “employ” state legislatures to see if they can find the necessary balm for what ills the American worker in areas where federal labor law remains silent. To borrow Justice Brandeis’s federalism conception, by allowing states to operate as laboratories of
experimentation today, workplace rights will not only flourish at the
state level in the short term, but also gain traction at the federal level
for years to come.
II.
In Taking States out of the Workplace, Professor Jeffrey Hirsch argues
that for workers’ best interests, states should play no role in regulating
the workplace. 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 225 (2008), http://
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thepocketpart.org/2008/04/01/hirsch.html. More specifically, he
argues that in order to make federal workplace law enforcement more
effective, state law should simply disappear, making regulation in this
area less complex and, therefore, more enforceable. Hirsch paints
with this anti-federalist broad brush, all the while conceding the current dire situation facing American workers.
For me, Hirsch’s anti-federalist stance is theoretically appealing
from a structural standpoint in that I agree that the federal government ideally would be best equipped to manage labor relations. But
the idea lacks practicality because of the current inability of the feds
to do anything of the sort. This skepticism of a benevolent, universal
federal regime is further fueled by the history of labor and employment law in contexts as diverse as union-management relations, occupational safety and health, and employer-provided pension and welfare benefits.
Courts, agencies, and employers have routinely
operated together in order to stifle employees’ rights to organize, to
receive promised pension and health benefits, and to work in a nonhazardous work environment. State regulation to fill in the gaps in
federal labor and employment is therefore vital to ameliorate the
harshness of these existing regimes.
In this Debate, I argue that state law should be permitted to play a
complementary role in all of these areas of workplace regulation
where federal law is silent or absent. Of course, in a short essay it is
not possible to explore the numerous state law initiatives that would
complement current federal labor and employment law. Yet, a recent
labor decision by the United States Supreme Court and a flurry of legislative initiatives by states in the labor relations context helpfully illuminate the dangers of an exclusive federal workplace regime and
the advantages of allowing states to provide additional protections for
workers.
III.
The workplace federalism debate has gained increased prominence in the labor-management world in light of the United States
Supreme Court’s decision last term in Chamber of Commerce v. Brown,
128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008). In Brown, the Court found that federal labor
law preempted a California state law which prohibited the use of state
funds by employers for anti- or pro-union expression. Justice Stevens,
for the majority, relied on the Machinists labor preemption doctrine to
find the California law preempted. That doctrine, based on a 1976
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Supreme Court case, requires a court to strike down a state law that
interferes with the free flow of economic forces between labor and
management. Justice Stevens concluded that the California law
impermissibly interfered with the free flow of economic forces in the
organizing context and thus carried no force. Consequently, California employers may now use state funds to fight unionization efforts.
The likely outcome of Brown is that many California employers
facing organizational campaigns will utilize these additional funds to
make anti-union presentations, called captive audience speeches. In
these meetings, employers force their employees during work to listen
to their views on union, political, and religious issues. (Wal-Mart has
recently been accused of engaging in these meetings with its employees for political purposes.) Employees in return usually cannot speak,
leave, or offer a rebuttal, without risking termination for insubordination. The effectiveness of this tactic is illustrated by the fact that a recent government report studying four hundred union campaigns
found that ninety-two percent of these campaigns included captive
audience meetings and the average union campaign had eleven such
captive audience meetings held by employers.
In an exclusive federal labor regime of the type Professor Hirsch
favors, that is the end of the story for employees. Employees will simply have to put up with captive audience speeches by their employers
in an at-will employment world and the likelihood of union representation will continue to dim with employers using state money to tilt
the economic forces, discussed in Brown, even further to their favor.
IV.
The operative legal regime need not exist in this manner. The
NLRA does not prohibit captive audience meetings, nor does it specifically include them within employee free speech rights under Section 8(c). This is because, since the National Labor Relations Board’s
(NLRB) Livingston Shirt decision in the early 1950s, captive audience
meetings have been found noncoercive and therefore not subject to
unfair labor practice proceedings. It is accurate to say that federal law
does not regulate captive audience meetings at all.
But what if states could come in and fill this gap in labor law, providing employees protection against captive audience meetings? The
answer depends on whether one thinks states should be able to enact
minimum conditions legislation to support these rights of workers to
organize.
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I believe such action on a state’s part would be consistent with the
long tradition of states using their police powers to protect the “life
and limb” of workers by regulating the workplace. States already do
this to a large degree in such diverse areas as employment discrimination, child labor, wage payment and collection, and hours and wages.
Consider that sexual orientation discrimination would not be outlawed but for state and local employment laws outlawing such behavior. Should we have waited for an amendment to Title VII to provide
any protection? How about the fact that low-income employees in certain states have earned additional income through living wage legislation? Should those workers have had to endure endless political debates about raising the federal minimum wage before receiving relief?
The answer is: of course not. So why shouldn’t states also be able
to protect workers from being harassed and intimidated by employers
at work through captive audience meetings as a minimal working
condition? So what if not all employees will be able to obtain this protection at one time? Isn’t it better to have some protection, as opposed to none at all, while waiting for federal laws to be enacted? And
let’s say that an Obama NLRB comes along and overrules Livingston
Shirt and declares captive audience meetings coercive under Section
8(c)? Are we any worse off that states have provided protection from
such practices in the meantime?
In fact, many states have already considered such legislation over
the last few years. Such Worker Freedom Act (WFA) legislation would
ensure minimum conditions for employees interested in forming a
union by outlawing employers from holding captive audience meetings during the workday.
V.
Now, it may be argued that even if state laws of the WFA-type are a
good idea, they are nevertheless preempted by the current federal labor law regime. Even in light of the Brown decision, however, I believe
WFA legislation should not be found preempted by the NLRA.
On the one hand, Garmon preemption is inapplicable because
such laws do not interfere with employee free choice under Section 7
because they may voluntary still choose to listen to their employer’s
views on unionization. See San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236 (1959). Nor do such laws permit what is impermissible
for employers to do under Section 8. Although employers are permitted under Section 8(c) of the Act to freely speak in a noncoercive
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matter about a union’s organizing campaign, that protection does not
extend to forcing employees at the pain of termination to hear those
same views.
Nor should the Machinists preemption of the Brown decision apply
in the workplace captive audience speech context. Unlike the state
funds issue at stake in Brown, there is little argument that the free
speech rights of employers will be impacted by WFA laws. Again, employers have the right to inform employees of their views on unionization on a voluntary basis, not to hold a proverbial gun to their head
and make them listen.
In all, WFA state legislation would add an important layer of protection to employee organizational rights.
VI.
Nevertheless, under Professor Hirsch’s anti-federalist views, such
legislation could not exist. He and others worry that if states can pass
laws like the WFA in labor-friendly states, then current right-to-work
states in the South and the West will pass legislation that will make
things even worse for workers. There is also something to the notion
that we as academics should not choose federal or state remedies for a
problem just because it squares with our political agenda.
Yet even though I believe that the federal government and the
NLRB should regulate private-sector labor relations through the
NLRA, there is no reason why state law cannot be an interim fix. If an
Obama Board later expressly prohibits such meetings under Section
8(c), the WFA laws would be Garmon preempted. Similarly, state laws
in this venue would not make labor law more complex as Hirsch fears
if a McCain Board moves specifically to permit such captive audience
meetings, which would thereby also Garmon preempt WFA legislation.
In other words, WFA legislation would act as a significant place holder
while the federal government debates the proper course and signals
to the feds that resolution of this issue is ripe.
Furthermore, the costs of state WFA enactment are relatively low
because it is hard to imagine how the background norms animating
state contract law (or property law for that matter) could be made
much more employer-friendly than they currently are (especially
given present federal and state minimum conditions legislation that
already exists). Employees in the United States exist in a world where
employers have nearly absolute property rights to exclude unions and
others from their workplaces and the employment at-will doctrine
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gives employers maximum flexibility when it comes to hiring and terminating their employees.
This is not to say that the labor movement should not continue to
search for a federal fix to this problem. Labor’s allies in Congress
have proposed in the last year alone a number of pieces of legislation
to try to ameliorate the current situation and, like Professor Hirsch, I
agree that with the “right” political results at the next election such
labor reform may be in the offing. But again, neither a McCain Board
or Obama Board decision, nor labor law reform of the NLRA itself,
would be impacted by state WFA legislation in the long-term. Such
state legislation would be preempted once the federal law is no longer
silent on the topic.
So while we wait for federal labor law reform, states should be
permitted to take up the mantle of workers’ rights and engage in
thoughtful, legislative experimentation. Such a move is an ironic necessity and, yes, perish the thought, consistent with notions of federalism.
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REBUTTAL
The True Irony of Workplace Law: Less is More
Jeffrey M. Hirsch

†

Attempts to reform our current workplace regulatory scheme
could move in two opposite directions: either add to today’s byzantine system of workplace rules or dramatically simplify that system.
One of the central fronts of this dispute is the states’ role in governing
the workplace. We could seek to expand the number of workplace
rights by giving states more authority, but we should first ask whether
workers would actually benefit from such a change. This question is
important, for the true irony of workplace law is that increasing the
number of workplace rights—particularly through state regulation—
may make workers worse off.
Professor Paul Secunda and I agree on many things. Most importantly, we both believe that the law should do more for workers.
Where we diverge is the solution. Professor Secunda would increase
states’ regulation of the workplace, allowing them to fill in gaps in
federal workplace regulations. This approach would certainly create
more rights for workers. But what good are those rights if workers are
unable to take advantage of them? Today, many workplace rights are
frequently left unfulfilled, a problem that an increased state role
would exacerbate. Thus, I argue for an approach that would help
employees actually enjoy the rights they have—an approach that
would eliminate states’ authority to regulate the workplace.
I.
The differences between our two approaches are perhaps less extreme than they first appear. In addition to sharing the same goal, I
concede that my proposal is not a perfect one. As Professor Secunda
accurately points out, some workers would be worse off if states no
longer had authority to regulate the workplace. However, the costs to
those workers would be outweighed by the benefits to other workers
and the workplace regulatory system as a whole. These benefits would
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largely result from correcting serious deficiencies in the enforcement
of today’s workplace laws.
Many scholars—Professor Secunda and myself included—have
decried the failure of a vast array of workplace laws to achieve their
promise. For example, despite the explicit prohibition against employment discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, many
workers must still endure discriminatory acts at the hands of their
employers. Similarly, the protections given to whistleblowers look
good on paper, but amount to virtually nothing in practice. The same
is true for numerous other workplace laws.
There are many causes for the deficiency of these laws, including
the current presidential administration’s resistance to workers’ rights.
But the problem is not one of politics alone. President Clinton’s administration was much friendlier to workers, but our workplace laws
still suffered many ills during his time in office. A more fundamental
reason for this growing problem is that the sheer complexity of today’s system of workplace laws makes compliance and enforcement of
those laws extraordinarily difficult. Federal, state, and local governments all have a role in workplace regulation, each with its own set of
laws. Moreover, these laws frequently cover the exact same type of
conduct. At times, these laws are consistent, but far too often they are
not.
So, why does this complexity matter? Imagine an employer that is
faced with a dizzying array of statutes, administrative rules, and cases
that may regulate its workplace. It requires a significant amount of resources to understand which laws apply and how to comply with them.
Things are even worse for employees. It is not surprising, given employers’ difficulty in understanding workplace laws, that employees
are at almost a complete loss. This is particularly significant because
most workplace rules require employees to initiate an action—a difficult requirement if they are not even aware of the rules or what they
mean. Finally, if a dispute actually manages to result in litigation, the
diverse set of workplace rules often requires multiple claims to be adjudicated in multiple forums. This duplicity is a waste of resources
and, not surprisingly, creates judicial resistance to such claims. The
result is a situation in which employers frequently do not comply with
workplace rules, employees lack the resources to enforce their rights,
and judges throw out good cases along with bad ones. In short, our
workplace rules fail to accomplish their own goals.
Cutting down on this complexity is critical to the ultimate usefulness of workplace rights. Professor Secunda’s proposal to increase
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state governance of the workplace runs directly counter to that goal.
Although the marginal effect of a single new state rule is low, the aggregate effect of numerous state-promulgated rules is great. The system is already bogged down by an overabundance of overlapping rules
and forums—adding to that burden makes little sense.
This burden leads me to argue for exclusive federal control of the
workplace. Admittedly, the federal government has not always been
the best enforcer of workplace laws, but such imperfection is still better than today’s convoluted system. Moreover, eliminating state regulation could lead to further simplification because placing all authority within one form of government provides a greater opportunity to
streamline rules.
II.
Professor Secunda, while conceding that federal control of an increasingly global workplace makes sense, argues that states still have
much to contribute to workers’ rights. Evidence of these contributions are fleeting, however. To be sure, states such as California have
more progressive workplace regulations than could be realistically enacted by the federal government. But numerous states have far more
regressive rules. Indeed, as bad as federal governance of the workplace has been at times, many states have exhibited substantially more
hostility to workplace rights. Making matters worse, these regressive
state rules often take the place of federal protections because proemployer lawmakers can use the crutch of states’ rights to resist federal reforms.
One way to address this problem would be to use a ratchet approach, in which the federal rules act as a floor that states could exceed. This approach would likely achieve the greatest level of workplace rights, although employees’ ability to enforce those rights is
questionable. Further, it is possible that if the federal government
had exclusive authority over the workplace, it would provide more
protection than it does now, as the theoretical possibility of state regulation would no longer exist. However, even if eliminating state governance would decrease the number of workplace rights, that decrease must still be weighed against the costs of a fragmented
workplace regulatory system. Any one state law has a low cost. But
aggregating those marginal effects greatly increases the impact.
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III.
A possible benefit of state control is the classic experimentation
theory of federalism, which suggests that the “best” policies will percolate in the states and be adopted nationwide. However, it is apparent
that there is no such percolation with regard to workplace regulation,
despite a long history of state governance. Although some bills first
appear in the states, they typically address old questions. For example, the Worker Freedom Act (WFA) bills that Professor Secunda advocates are technically new, but they go to the legality of captive audience speeches—a question that labor law has struggled with for
decades. Moreover, states generally pick from a menu of wellestablished regulatory options, rather than act as testing ground for
truly novel ideas. The formulation of state workplace regulations
looks like a typical struggle among political actors, not a laboratory
experiment.
The importance of politics in determining workplace rules has
long been a constant, both at the federal and state level. This reality is
not only an impetus behind Professor Secunda’s proposal, but an impediment to it as well. As he notes, the current presidential administration has been no friend to workers. Given the administration’s
stance, why would it give states more power to undermine its policy
goals? Expanding state authority in an attempt to increase workers’
rights is likely to succeed only where it is least needed—in a federal
government where lawmakers are already welcoming of such rights.
Further, focusing workplace regulation in one system would give
worker-side groups a better opportunity to sway the political debate,
no matter which party is in power. Currently, only employers have the
resources to maintain a significant lobbying presence at every level of
government that enacts workplace rules. Employers will always have
more resources, but focusing workplace regulations at the federal
level would at least allow worker-side groups to be in the game.
Finally, Professor Secunda’s reference to Chamber of Commerce v.
Brown illustrates the danger of expanding state authority over the
workplace. If he is correct that Brown and the NLRA’s preemption
doctrines do not foreclose state WFA statutes—and I am not sure that
he is—then he is proposing to add significant complications to union
organizing disputes. Currently, the NLRA’s robust preemption means
that the NLRB controls virtually all aspects of the organizing process.
Thus, if the parties argue that the other side used improper tactics,
such as retaliatory terminations or overly coercive captive audience
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meetings, the NLRB adjudicates all of those allegations in a single
proceeding. To be sure, the NLRB adjudicatory process could be improved, as it often takes longer than it should and lacks remedies sufficient to deter much unlawful conduct; however, adding state laws to
the mix is not the solution. Indeed, Professor Secunda’s support for
state WFA statutes runs counter to one view of the NLRB’s unwillingness to proscribe captive audience meetings—that they are a normal
and acceptable part of a union campaign. Although I do not agree
with that view, allowing states to fill in this “gap” may be ignoring that
there really is no gap to be filled. More significantly, state WFA statutes would make the resolution of union election disputes more difficult.
In contrast to the NLRB’s current control over union elections,
imagine the same campaign dispute in a state that passed a WFA statute (Professor Secunda’s state of Wisconsin is a possible option, unlike
my state of Tennessee which would be more likely to ban unions if it
were given the authority to do so). For instance, imagine that a union
lost an election and alleges that the employer used unlawful terminations or captive audience meetings to intimidate workers. However,
this time, the dispute is split between two forums. The NLRB retains
jurisdiction over the NLRA allegations, but now an entirely new claim
exists. The parties must litigate that claim in a state forum, but how
would that litigation fit with the NLRB case? The parties could easily
be in a situation in which the state forum finds that the captive audience meetings violated the WFA statute, but the NLRB finds that the
meetings did not violate the NLRA. From the employees’ perspective,
the WFA victory provides little solace because the NLRB would not
overturn an election based on an action that violates state law but is
permitted under the agency’s interpretation of the NLRA. Therefore,
unless the WFA statute has significant fines, what good is it other than
to make election litigation more complicated?
IV.
Federalism is not a theory that requires adherence for its own
sake. Devolving authority to states is intended to provide benefits.
Where those benefits are unable to offset the costs involved with state
governance of an area, federalism should take a backseat to a different
form of policymaking.
Few areas illustrate the costs of federalism more than workplace
law. The complexity and confusion caused by multiple sources of law
undermines the very purpose of those laws. We should not, then, add
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to the problem by giving states more authority, even if the current political situation makes that strategy tempting. We should instead remember that political power is fleeting and devise a system of workplace governance that is focused on the government best situated to
regulate that area and most likely to create a system that accomplishes
its goals. The federal government’s regulation of the workplace has
been far from perfect, but it is a far better choice than fifty different
state regimes.
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CLOSING STATEMENT
More of Less: The Limits of Minimalism and Self-Regulation
Paul M. Secunda
The battle lines have been sufficiently drawn in this Debate on the
appropriateness of state regulation of the workplace. I favor states
playing a gap-filling role in workplace regulation where federal law is
absent or silent and as part of their traditional role in legislating
minimum condition laws to protect workers from inhumane working
conditions. Professor Hirsch, on the other hand, seeks the complete
eradication of all state workplace regulation and advocates an exclusive federal law regime. His hope is that such a new system will actually make workers better off because they will more easily be able to
enforce their remaining rights in a less complex regulatory world.
The problem, however, is not one of complexity, but that federal
agencies charged with carrying out the current law have neither the
financial resources, the political will, nor the administrative tools to
implement, enforce, and adjudicate these laws. Eradicating state authority over the workplace will not only fail to solve the present-day
enforcement issues that Professor Hirsch and I agree are very real, but
will also leave workers even more vulnerable to abuse as a result of
fewer employment protections.
I.
Rather than reiterate points already made in the Opening Statements, I thought it would be useful to illustrate my concerns about increased abuse of workers in an exclusive federal regime by taking Professor Hirsch at his word and carrying out a thought experiment. In
this hypothetical world, only federal workplace laws exist. Nevertheless, the federal government continues to prove unwilling and unable
to protect the basic rights of workers through laws like the NLRA, ERISA, and OSHA. States have now, however, been field preempted out
of the workplace regulation game.
What approaches are left for governmental decision makers who
still cannot adequately enforce these employment laws? One possible
approach is suggested by a number of legal scholars who have advocated for a third way of workplace regulation: new governance or self-
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regulation. Its governance model is one of flexibility, adaptability,
and non-coercive “soft” law. Some of these types of schemes already
exist in the real world and one such model has already been implemented for over twenty-five years by the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) in the form of the Voluntary Protection Programs (VPP).
Through this real-world example, this Closing Statement seeks to
define the limits of the minimalist approach that Professor Hirsch and
the new governance theorists prefer under the rubric that “less is
more.” An examination of VPP, however, establishes the consequent
need for state workplace regulation.
II.
In Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, Professor Orly Lobel describes a “new governance” model having organizing principles
“consisting of increased participation of nonstate actors, public/private collaboration, diversity and competition, decentralization
and subsidarity, integration of policy domains, flexibility and noncoerciveness (‘soft law’), adaptability and learning, and finally, legal orchestration.” Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research,
89 MINN. L. REV. 498, 498 (2004). Professor Lobel’s goal is to set up
new governance theory as a “third way” that transcends the current dichotomy between command-and-control regulation and complete deregulation. Although she applies her paradigm to different areas of
law, for the purposes of this debate, I focus on the application of this
governance model to the workplace.
First, to be fair, there does not seem to be a unified set of prescriptions that the new governance model requires in the workplace
and Lobel emphasizes that its application is context-sensitive to the
legal problem being addressed. Indeed, she identifies the constant
call for renewal from within the model to be a key feature and stresses
that flexibility and “soft law” should not be confused with a voluntary
system.
Nevertheless, I believe that the practical result of this increased
call for decentralization, flexibility, and soft law approaches to the
workplace will be the further aggrandizement of employer power at
the expense of employees. The administrative model that Lobel envisions, and to which the Hirsch exclusively federal regime will likely
lead, is one that relies on a flexible, opt-in employment regulation system. Employers are given some incentive to comply with the law and
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to implement internally best practices, but in these programs there
appears to be lack of voluntary participation and program costs that
exceed expected benefits. Instead of leading to more effective selfpolicing of the workplace by employers, this formalization of informal
workplace practices suffers from self-selection bias and inefficient prioritization of limited agency resources.
III.
Consider one of the practical examples that Professor Lobel sets
forth in the employment context and keep in mind how it would operate in the minimalist model of regulation that Professor Hirsch favors. Lobel has argued for the expansion of governance-based approaches to worker safety and health while simultaneously expanding
targeted enforcement in the context of federal OSHA regulation.
Under the VPP, which has existed in one form or another at
OSHA since 1982, labor, management, and the government work together to create a collaborative system for ensuring workplace safety
and health. More specifically, the program requires employers to
meet certain performance-based criteria for a managed safety and
health system. For example, VPP participants must achieve illness and
injury rates at or below the national average for their industries. Perhaps not surprisingly then, VPP work sites have more than fifty percent below the average missed-days-from-work-rates than similar organizations in their industries.
In return for participation in VPP, employers are supposed to
benefit through fewer injuries and illnesses in the workplace and
therefore, lower workers compensation premiums and fewer days
missed by employees at work. Perhaps more importantly and concretely, from participating employers’ point of view, is that VPP members are removed from OSHA’s programmed inspection list, which
means their workplaces will only be inspected by OSHA if there is an
accident or an employee files a complaint. Moreover, OSHA does not
issue citations for standard violations by VPP participating employers
as long as they are corrected. Once certified, most VPP employers are
inspected every three to five years to see if they are still in compliance.
This cooperative approach seeks to give incentive to employers to
self-report by eliminating statutory penalties. At the same time, the
hope is that self-complying employers will take some of the strain off
of OSHA in implementing and enforcing workplace safety and health
law and allow the agency to focus on higher risk industries. In short,
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this program trusts employers to do the right thing from a safety and
health perspective voluntarily.
Nevertheless, the VPP program suffers from some significant
problems. Even Lobel recognizes the danger inherent in relying too
much on employer cooperation and not enough on enforcement, especially when these cooperative programs develop in a primarily voluntary manner. In such instances, these cooperative workplace programs can become window dressing on a safety and health workplace
epidemic facing low-wage workers who engage in some of the most
hazardous jobs.
Three primary reasons explain the program’s dysfunction. First,
voluntary compliance programs are not cheap, and OSHA has been
spending more of its ever-decreasing budgets on these programs in
the last number of years as part of a larger deregulation movement by
the Bush administration. Second, companies that already care about
safety and health issues self-select into the VPP program because they
know their illness/injury rates are below the national average for their
industry, so why not get the seal of approval from OSHA while avoiding routine inspections and some citations? Third, even with the tremendous surge of participants in the VPP program over the last eight
years, with numbers more than doubling, there still are only two thousand participants out of the approximately seven million workplaces
covered by OSHA.
All of these issues together suggest that these same VPP companies would have met these standards anyway without the additional incentive and that the agency may be throwing money into a scheme
that does not increase the overall rate of compliance with OSHA regulations. In fact, OSHA has fewer resources to ensure compliance with
law by the vast majority of employers in this country, which means
more workplaces are escaping even routine inspection by OSHA and
more workers are subject to increased safety and health risks in the
workplace.
All told, the use of the VPP program by OSHA casts substantial
doubt on the efficacy of new governance approaches. After years of
self-reflexive experimentation with the VPP process, there is no empirical evidence that it has made workplace safety and health regulations less complex or more easily enforceable (one of the benefits
Professor Hirsch seeks with the elimination of state regulation). Indeed, to the extent that OSHA no longer provides a public forum to
address the most common workplace safety and health issues for VPP
employers, this governance approach also takes away from account-
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ability and transparency in the workplace at a time in our country’s
history when such public goods are at a premium.
IV.
So what is the connection between Professor Hirsch’s minimalist
approach and the new governance one of Professor Lobel? Although
Professor Hirsch does not discuss the merits of the new governance
approach (and perhaps his Closing Statement will challenge my view
that his regulatory regime will inevitably lead to dependence on new
governance-based programs), his reliance on a minimalist scheme will
likely require the use of governance approaches to make up for the
lack of effective command-and-control enforcement at the federal
level. Indeed, as Professor Cynthia Estlund has elaborated upon,
there has been a growing trend among employers to adopt this selfregulation model in all areas of employment law. See Cynthia Estlund,
Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2005). I fear the federal-only regulated workplace envisioned by Professor Hirsch will devolve into a system in
which employers internalize regulatory enforcement and thereby exacerbate the vulnerability of workers who increasingly lack a collective
voice within these companies.
At the end of the day, workers need more protection in the workplace, not less. Yet fewer laws, all at the federal level, insure less formalized protections and more dependence on employers acting out
of altruistic motives and not just trying to get away with as much as
possible. I, for one, do not believe that adequate incentives currently
exist in federal law for noncompliant employers to act substantially on
their employees’ behalf. When push comes to shove, and employees
face employer intimidation when attempting to organize the workplace or an employee files claims of sexual orientation discrimination
not covered by federal law, I would prefer employees have the concrete ability to bring a claim under state or local law, even given the
problem of accessibility to adjudicative forums that may arise.
V.
In The Big Squeeze, Steve Greenhouse recently described the lack of
respect that American employees receive in the workplace. STEVEN
GREENHOUSE, THE BIG SQUEEZE: TOUGH TIMES FOR THE AMERICAN
WORKER 142-45, 207-09 (2008); Steven Greenhouse, Too Much
Squeezing and Too Little Respect, TODAY’S WORKPLACE, http://
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www.todaysworkplace.org/2008/09/01/too-much-squeezing-and-toolittle-respect. Examples included a Wal-Mart cashier who had managers that were so stingy about bathroom breaks that some cashiers
ended up soiling themselves, a computer engineer who was laid off
while his eight-year-old was visiting on Take Your Daughter to Work
Day, and a software engineer who was suddenly fired along with seventeen other engineers and told that, if they wanted any severance pay,
they had to train the workers from India replacing them. Of course,
there are a myriad of even more examples of employees at all levels
suffering from similar and worse affronts.
In this environment, workers should not be forced to exclusively
depend on federal work laws that are out-dated for our globalized
workplace (i.e., NLRA), under-utilized because of a lack of resources
and questionable priorities (i.e., OSHA), or just plain cruel in their
implementation because of the lack of remedial alternatives (i.e.,
ERISA). Nor should workers have to rely on vague promises that federal workplace regulation will someday get better. Employees will not
regain respect from their employers through such a self-regulatory
scheme. They need all the help they can get in this employment-atwill, right-to-work world. And if the needed regulation is only available through the states, then so be it.
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CLOSING STATEMENT
Paper Rights or Real Rights?
Jeffrey M. Hirsch
Paper rights or real rights? That is the choice to be made between
adding to the already large number of complex and ineffective workplace rights or trying to find a different approach that gives employees
what they have been promised. Both Professor Secunda and I seek to
enhance workplace protections for employees and—on paper—his
argument for allowing states to enact gap-filling rights makes sense.
But I fear that this additional authority would increase employers’ and
the judiciary’s already significant hostility to workplace rights, and further hinder employees’ ability to understand and enforce those rights.
My primary assertion is that we need first a different means to enforce current workplace goals, not a reshaping of the goals themselves. I am sympathetic to Professor Secunda’s desire to expand
workers’ substantive rights, but that argument puts the cart before the
horse. Simply adding more laws is unlikely to achieve the desired effect. We should instead create a less complex system that actually enforces the rights that exist.
Professor Secunda responds with a hypothetical federal regime
that relies heavily on voluntary compliance. Certainly this is a possibility that would likely undermine employees’ rights. However, it is not
one that I have advocated. Indeed, I have strongly argued for a far
different approach: a regulatory regime that relies on private rights of
action and provides more incentives for these claims than exist under
many of today’s workplace laws.
I.
Professor Secunda warns that exclusive federal governance will
“inevitably lead to dependence on new governance-based programs.”
These programs move away from traditional command-and-control
governance by embracing flexible and noncoercive attempts to
achieve self-compliance. As Professor Orly Lobel’s work in this area
reveals, there are both benefits and costs to such governance. Professor Secunda argues that a move away from command-and-control governance would result in worse conditions for employees. Although I
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recognize the importance of some encouragement of employer selfcompliance through nonpunitive means, I agree with Professor
Secunda that such measures should not replace more traditional
workplace regulations. That is why, in a current working paper, my
proposal for exclusive federal regulation of the workplace uses an enforcement model that firmly relies upon private rights of action. Professor Secunda, in short, has attacked a straw man that I have not advocated and that is not an inevitable result of exclusive federal
authority.
In my arguments for reshaping workplace law at the federal level,
I have promoted a simpler, more understandable system of enforcement. However, that simplification does not abandon litigation. To
the contrary, I have proposed a system that would primarily rely on
private rights of action brought in federal court, possibly a new specialized labor and employment court. Indeed, my belief that litigation
is the best means of enforcement even leads me to reject a growing
trend of encouraging private arbitration of workplace disputes. The
new “soft-law” type of enforcement measures that worries Professor
Secunda could not be further from my intention.
Moreover, noncoercive enforcement measures are not an inevitable result of federal governance. These alternatives are still novel and
their use has not been widespread in either state or federal workplace
regulations. Even if something as radical as giving the federal government exclusive authority over the workplace occurred, there is no
reason to think that the traditional governance approach would
change. Professor Secunda’s own examples prove the point. He
notes two federal statutes with strong federal preemption—the NLRA
and ERISA. Although both statutes have their share of problems, neither relies in any meaningful way upon noncoercive enforcement
schemes. Which federal statute does rely upon such measures? It is
OSHA, which happens to be a statute that allows for concurrent state
regulation. Although OSHA has a preemption clause, states may get
permission to enforce federal safety and health regulations in the private sector, and almost half of them have taken advantage of this option. Thus, if voluntary compliance is the natural result of any enforcement scheme—and I do not believe that it is—current
experience shows that it is more likely to result from joint federal-state
control, not exclusive federal authority.
Professor Cynthia Estlund’s work impliedly supports this idea. As
Professor Secunda notes, she has described employers’ growing use of
self-regulation. Yet, Professor Estlund also emphasizes that “[t]he

49

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
PENNumbra

[Vol. 157: 28

move toward self-regulation has not made major inroads on the basic
federal labor standards statutes themselves. Still, state and federal
regulatory agencies have begun to experiment with forms of selfregulation within the confines of these command-and-control statutes.” Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of
Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 342-43 (2005) (footnotes
omitted). It appears that state governance presents as much, if not
more, risk of noncoercive enforcement than federal governance.
II.
Although I disagree with his analysis, I appreciate Professor
Secunda’s discussion of noncoercive enforcement measures, as it is
exactly the type of conversation that I hoped my initial proposal would
initiate. My frustrations with the almost single-minded focus on substantive provisions—despite obvious failures with the system as a
whole—is what led me to ask whether we might do better. The substantive arguments are important. However, they are severely circumscribed if they remain part of a broken enforcement scheme.
In asking what we can do to improve enforcement of workplace
laws, I have presumed a fixed level of workplace protection that is
equivalent to the status quo. That is not to say that I approve of the
status quo; rather, I think we should address the enforcement problem before worrying about specific substantive issues. There are reasonable disagreements as to the best way to improve enforcement, but
my belief is that exclusive federal control would better achieve our
current workplace goals.
Although eliminating state governance would directly simplify enforcement, exclusive federal authority would also allow for other improvements to the enforcement regime. Thus, my proposal identifies
several areas in which the patchwork of workplace rights and standards can be simplified, even within a single system. For instance, I
recommend placing all workplace laws under a single statute. Importantly, this scheme would, as much as possible, establish a unitary set
of rules for all workplace claims. No longer would a worker have to
worry about differences in each law’s statutes of limitations, burdens
of proof, definitions, and a host of other provisions.
Moreover, fewer laws could actually produce greater protections.
For example, as I have explained elsewhere, one could replace all current laws affecting terminations with a unitary business-justification
requirement. The change would dramatically reduce the number of
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provisions regulating the end of the employment relationship. Yet, in
doing so, it could actually strengthen the policies of those provisions
by establishing a single, relatively uncomplicated rule for terminations. Such a rule would make it easier to recognize and challenge
terminations that were based on discrimination or other illicit reasons, while also reducing the hostility that often stands in the way of
such claims.
I would also place authority to administer this statute with a single
agency. Eliminating the current alphabet soup of agencies with authority over the workplace would help make workplace rights more
consistent and avoid the problems that can occur when an agency
with a very narrow specialty deals with a case touching on broader issues. Take, for example, the NLRB’s latest attempt to determine
whether non-unionized employees enjoy the same right under the
NLRA to have a co-worker present during an investigatory interview
that unionized employees’ possess. In reversing its previous position
that non-unionized employees have that right, the NLRB relied on
employers’ need to conduct investigations of sexual harassment. If
the NLRB had any significant experience with such claims, it may have
recognized that no serious conflict existed between an employer investigating claims of harassment and an employee electing to have a
co-worker present for an interview. A single agency with authority
over all workplace claims would be in a much better position to handle the large number of workplace disputes that implicate a variety of
policy concerns.
Finally, and most important to Professor Secunda’s argument, I
advocate a litigation-based enforcement approach. Although I would
accept the use of today’s judicial system for resolving the new workplace claims, I recommend the creation of a specialized, Article III labor and employment court. Such a court provides the benefits of an
Article III tribunal while avoiding today’s unfortunate reality, in which
many judges exhibit not only an ignorance of the underlying policies
of workplace laws, but an outright hostility to such claims. The number of claims and their complexity are a large part of this problem;
thus, by simplifying these claims and removing them to a specialized
court, the judicial impediments to the enforcement of workplace
rights will be dramatically lessened. However, this change, as well as
those accompanying the unitary law and agency, would not be possible under a system where state and local governments continue to
possess significant authority over the workplace.
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III.
The question of whether and how to increase the number of
workplace rights is important. Yet it is a secondary concern. Increasing workplace protections via a broken system creates false hope and
ultimately leaves workers with few if any gains. Instead, we should
strive to fix the broken enforcement framework and then worry about
expanding rights. To do otherwise only serves to remind us of what
we could have achieved if we had resisted yet another shortsighted
change and instead sought to harmonize our regulation of the workplace.
Ultimately, both Professor Secunda and I believe that the federal
government currently fails to provide enough protections for workers.
He believes that this performance is unlikely to improve and, even if it
does, giving states increased authority would help address whatever
shortcomings exist. The costs associated with a further fragmentation
of workplace law makes me disagree. I acknowledge that, on paper,
Professor Secunda is correct and that there is a danger that a proemployer federal government could use its exclusive authority to drop
the level of protections below a critical threshold. However, the possible gains of a more streamlined and effective workplace regulatory
system seem worth that risk.
Moreover, I do not think the potential trade-off is particularly
large, as I am extremely doubtful that increased state regulations
would help much. Only a small handful of states have actively increased workplace protections. In contrast, most states either do little
more than mirror the federal status quo or aggressively favor employer interests over those of workers. In short, even if Professor
Secunda is correct that federal agencies “carrying out the current law
have neither the financial resources, the political will, nor the administrative tools to implement, enforce, and adjudicate these laws,” it is
important to remember that state legislatures and agencies have even
fewer of these characteristics.
The crux of Professor Secunda’s argument is that the imperfect
solution of fragmented state gap filling is better than nothing. For
some workers, at least in the short term, he is no doubt correct. But
that strategy may be short-lived. It would continue to apply small
bandages over significant problems—bandages that give federal policymakers an excuse not to seek a real solution. It would also represent yet another example of incremental policymaking that has produced the current patchwork of workplace laws that Professor
Secunda agrees is broken.
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Why not, instead, look holistically at workplace laws and try to devise a system that works better? My sense is that exclusive federal governance is the best strategy. But even if one disagrees with my specific
proposal, that does not mean that a different solution is not available.
What seems clear, however, is that simply tinkering with our current
system is the one strategy that is doomed to failure. Even if we expand
the number of workplace rights on paper, past experience has shown
repeatedly that such an expansion often does not lead to significantly
better conditions for workers. We should therefore aim for a system
that does what is says, rather than continually providing false hope. In
short, if the choice is between paper rights and real rights, I’ll take the
latter.
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